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Inside and Outside Romanticism
The Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy by Ian Balfour. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002. Pp. x + 346. $65.00 cloth, $24.95 paper.
The Historical Austen by William H. Galperin. Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 286. $39.95 cloth.
Metaromanticism: Aesthetics, Literature, Theory by Paul Hamilton. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2003. Pp. viii + 316. $25.00 paper.
The Satiric Eye: Forms of Satire in the Romantic Period edited by Steven E. Jones.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Pp. 231. $55.00 cloth.
The Politics of Aesthetics: Nationalism, Gender, Romanticism by Marc Redfield.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003. Pp. xi + 252. $55.00 cloth.
William Blake and the Impossible History of the 1790s by Saree Makdisi.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xviii + 394. $22.00 paper.
Little can be taken for granted in Romantic studies. The canon has been
expanding since the 1990s, and what is familiar—the Big Six poets—has been
variously reconfigured. “Romantic-era literature” usually designates the writing in the fifty years from 1780 to 1830, but there is also the long eighteenth
century that subsumes Romanticism within non-Romantic literary-historical
narratives, and some periodizations lay claim to a Romantic century, 1750 to
1850, colonizing both the age of Johnson and the early Victorian period. Identifying something called Romanticism, always a risky enterprise (Arthur
Lovejoy [1924] and Irving Massey [1964] demonstrated the incoherence of
the concept),1 is no less risky but has not stopped the construction of multiple Romanticisms, from Anne Mellor’s female Romanticism (1992) to Jerome
McGann’s poetry of sensibility (1996).2 “Romanticism” is the interpretive
sense we make of Romantic-era literature by means of diachronic and synchronic narratives. That there are multiple narratives does not render the concept useless, but Romanticism must be understood in the plural. In the wake
of the feminist and historicist dismantling of the older Romanticism, especially Bloom’s “visionary company” and the Wordsworth-centered poetry of
consciousness and nature, one has to ask whether one of the goals of the new
interpreters has been achieved: are we still reading Romanticism by means of
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its own constructions, or have we so far removed ourselves from the assumptions of Romantic texts that we are finally outside of Romanticism? Do we
want to be outside of Romanticism? Is it possible to get outside of Romanticism? Are we finally free of Romantic ideology?
Not to leave anyone in suspense, I will answer my own questions: yes, no,
impossible to say, no, no. We are still within Romanticism, despite the strenuous efforts to propel us out of its gravitational force, for any number of reasons.
As even Romanticism’s harshest critics, such as Clifford Siskin, illustrate, our
world is still shaped by Romantic assumptions about, among other things,
psychological development.3 Genealogies of contemporary literary culture
can hardly skip over Romanticism, whether it is the lines of influence drawn
by Bloom or by McGann, whether the line is continued by a neo-Romantic like
Ted Hughes or a language poet like Charles Bernstein. When we use Derridean
mixing of philosophy and literature to interpret Romantic texts, we are repeating Blake in his Marriage of Heaven and Hell and the Jena Romantikers in their
aphorisms. As Freud readily conceded, the Romantics wrote extensively
about the unconscious years before his own Interpretation of Dreams. Feminist
theorists can and do quarrel with the texts of Wollstonecraft and Mary Robinson, but feminist theory, as a modern intellectual enterprise, begins with these
Romantics. In the Romantic era one finds numerous anticipations of Marx
and his sociopolitical critique, as well as early versions of socialism, communism, anarchism, and social democracy. The British Empire makes huge
advances, culturally and politically, but concurrently receives fundamental
criticism. Similarly, the slave trade peaks at the same time that also includes a
well-developed abolitionist movement. Ecocriticism has evolved largely out
of Anglo-American Romanticism. Moreover, there is also the Gadamerian
argument that Romanticism is one of the things that has shaped our preunderstanding, that has inscribed us with meanings we cannot disentangle
from our lifeworld. Is there a critical discourse uncontaminated by Romanticera writing and thinking?
The historicist critiques of Romanticism, which largely deployed one
strand of Romanticism against another, provided an exhilarating distance
between a lucid us and a deluded them, an unbreachable gap between now and
then, thus producing moments of insight into the pastness of the past yet also
another version of the Enlightenment subject whose reason becomes objectified domination, just as in that Enlightenment narrative of “superstition,” the
story of Frankenstein. Jerome McGann’s Romantic Ideology (1983) checked
this dialectic of Enlightenment with romanticizing countermovements, for
which inconsistency Marc Redfield among many others has criticized him
(30–31). David Simpson, by including a psychoanalytic with his historicizing
dialectic, prevented from the start an objectivist kind of commentary in his
New Historicist books on Wordsworth.4 During the 1980s and 1990s, how-
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ever, there was a strong movement to purify Romanticism of its ideology, with
Wordsworth as the favorite target and “Tintern Abbey” as the locus classicus
where the interpretive labor took place. Poetic idealizations concealed material processes of political evasion, gender domination, and forms of displacement, psychic and cultural, all of which required demystification. However
necessary and valuable this cultural work, it entailed more than occasionally
a moralism inevitable but no less distracting. In instances when the texts of
Wordsworth or Percy Shelley became personified as bad men who needed
punishing, the moralism had been carried to an extreme that was, however,
accepted at the time. To make an omelet, apparently, one has to break a few
eggs. Not that the moralistic excesses have had much consequence: Wordsworth and Percy Shelley are still read and written about, if not with the same
cultural awe as in the pre-1980 period, if not as centrally located in the canon
as they once were. An anecdote: during a recent North American Society for
the Study of Romanticism conference presentation of a play by a noncanonical Romantic, a feminist scholar leaned over to me at the intermission and
whispered wearily, “Wordsworth it isn’t.” She wasn’t talking about Dorothy
either.
So where are we now? Is it the same old Hegelian story of antithetical journey out only to return where we started—but with a difference? Yes and no.
There is general acceptance that—like it or not (and most of us seem content)—we are within Romanticism, crosshatched with ideology about which
we can declaim in precise detail, enlarged by a canon expansion that is still in
process, reconfigured in multiple ways by synchronic and diachronic interpretive narratives. The desire to get outside Romanticism has not been forsaken, because it appears in the move toward totality evident in more than a
few ambitiously theoretical efforts. How does it all fit together, and where are
we in this network of meanings? To understand the parts, one must know the
whole, but the whole is unknowable except in its parts. The paradox of the
hermeneutic circle drives us to the utopia of interpretation, which still “beacons . . . darkly, fearfully, afar”—but we know that, if we ever get there, we will
be within Romanticism, not outside it.
The six books under consideration reveal some newer trends as well as
continuations of older tendencies in Romantic studies. The two single-author
studies, both on canonical figures, are of the critical moment for different reasons. Galperin locates Austen in a now no longer anomalous Romantic context and grounds his close readings in fully assimilated theoretical
engagements, especially but not limited to de Certeau. Makdisi’s Blake is
framed by Said’s Orientalism (1978), Iain McCalman’s Radical Underworld
(1988), and Jon Mee’s Dangerous Enthusiasm (1992). The Romantic author as
genius is a still legible and appropriate topos, but in both studies genius is
decentered by innumerable forces. The other four books consist of two generic
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studies and two explicitly theoretical reflections. Before 1980, Romantic satire
was a subject for maybe an article, but now, as is evident in Jones’s essay collection, it is a field, reflecting one area of canon expansion, as a neglected
archive receives its due attention. How the genre of satire had come to be neglected is a story unto itself, revealing the ideological investments of earlier
constructions of Romanticism. Balfour writes on prophecy, a long-recognized
literary mode prominent in M. H. Abrams’s Natural Supernaturalism (1971),
which highlights Romanticism’s secularization of religious themes, but Balfour’s use of Walter Benjamin, whose writings are provocatively brought to
bear on issues throughout the study, carries the interpretation back to our own
moment. The two theoretical studies mix readings of literary texts, German
and English, with reflections on Theory and Romanticism. The uppercase “T”
Theory brings us back to a moment in Romantic studies when Theory was
dominant, when de Man was alive, before l’affaire de Man and the war writings—before the triumph of historicism and feminism. Redfield is a strong
partisan of de Man, but even Hamilton, who is not, makes extensive use of his
writing, suggesting that the critical moment will permit a mature examination. Perhaps now Michael Ryan and Julie Rivkin would not exclude de Man
entirely from their hefty anthology of literary theory, as they indeed did five
years ago.5
Makdisi’s book on Blake is a forthright defense of the poet on political, even
moral grounds (Blake is generous, kind, and humane [xii]). Makdisi provides
a narrative of modernization, revolution, and empire into which he inserts
Blake, and within which Blake becomes an effective illustrating example. The
story told by Makdisi portrays Blake as a writer who opposed not just the dominant political and religious authorities, as the liberal radicals also did, but also
the intellectual roots of modernization (Bacon, Newton, Locke) as well as the
future political and religious authorities who are evident in figures like Paine,
Wollstonecraft, and Thelwall. Blake was not an isolated rebel but part of an
antinomian tradition, a radical underground, those who wrote within the
assumptions of “enthusiasm,” dating back at least to the seventeenth-century
religious revolutionaries. Makdisi sharply distinguishes a mainstream left—
the London Corresponding Society, Paine, Thelwall—that he calls hegemonic
or liberal radicalism from the antinomian left of Thomas Spence, Robert Wedderburn, Citizen Lee, and of course Blake himself. The liberal radicals suffered
political defeat, as did the antinomians, but eventually the modernization
process for which the liberals were actually fighting, including empire, did
indeed triumph, whereas Blake and his comrades opposed empire and capitalism root and branch. The defense of Blake, then, goes with a critique of
Wollstonecraft et alia for their promotion of modernity and its “fundamental
conceptual categories” such as “the stable unitary subject, the sovereign individual,” which are essential for “liberalism, republicanism, and commodity
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culture” (2). The liberals were Orientalist in their celebration of “the modern
self ’s superiority to the Oriental other” (4), whereas Blake made common
cause with Orientals, as well as “the poor and unlearned,” Asians, Africans,
“fellow labourers,” and “children” (4). Blake and his tradition provide an
enduringly radical opposition to our bourgeois world, whereas the tradition
of Thelwall and Paine has manifested itself as our world. Through Blake, Makdisi vindicates a particular radical tradition not just in an act of historical sympathy but in an act of political identification. This is the most political reading
of Blake since Erdman’s Blake: Prophet Against Empire (1977).
Makdisi’s study is most successful when it locates in Blake’s own texts—
America especially, as well as the Urizen books—the critique of modernization
that is central to his political analysis. He provides excellent commentary on
Blake’s texts and methods, his philosophical assumptions, his key metaphors.
Makdisi persuasively argues that in the illuminated books Urizen is “a supervisory regulating power” (124) and “the dark satanic mill” is “a figure not just
of the organization of production in early industrial society” but also—echoing Foucault’s concept of biopower—“a figure of the social, political, and religious constitution of the individual psychobiological subject” (131). Blake’s
texts represent industrial work discipline as it is experienced in the body and
emotions. Makdisi’s discussion of Blake’s principles of organization—“organization”—is especially effective, as Blake reinforces his critique of unilinear
narrative with his variously organized versions of the “same” text that cannot
be read as conventional narratives (ch. 3). Chapter 4 describes Blake’s production of texts and images in the context of artisanal and industrial modes of
production, drawing upon the previous work of Essick and Viscomi to emphasize the centrality of Blake’s political critique of industrial production of commodities that depends on an equality of exchange. Blake’s writing attacks
precisely such an equality of exchange from multiple angles. Chapter 5 contrasts Blake, prophet against empire, with liberal radicals like Wollstonecraft
whose Orientalism sustained the project of imperial conquest. The final chapter, “Impossible History and the Politics of Hope,” identifies “impossible” as
not imaginable within a Whiggish history of progressive development. After a
fascinating discussion of Blakean “production,” Makdisi makes an extensive
critique of Locke, Paine, Thelwall, and the Levellers from the position of an
antinomianism that has many different historical manifestations, from the
Diggers to the insurgent “Atlantic” proletariat described in Peter Linebaugh
and Marcus Redeker’s The Many-Headed Hydra: The Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (2000).
I cannot remember a study that has so intensively and usefully developed
the importance of modernization for Blake, and modernization has become—
as it was in Makdisi’s earlier book, Romantic Imperialism (1998)—an important area of study. Blake’s belonging to an antinomian tradition is something
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that by now we can take for granted, as it has been illustrated by A. L. Morton,
E. P. Thompson, Michael Ferber, and Jon Mee. I have to question, however, the
way Makdisi elides Blake with antinomian political activists like Spence
unless it makes no difference whatsoever whether one is a political revolutionary or an engraver-poet. Another elision is Makdisi’s neglect of the most
difficult Blake texts—Four Zoas, Milton, Jerusalem. It is not that the themes of
modernization and antinomian desire could not be found in these texts, but
that neglecting them makes it easier to evade the problem of rhetoric and audience in Blake. I also find tendentious the way he characterizes the differences
between the antinomian left and the liberal left. In Seditious Allegories (2001),
I illustrate both differences and similarities between Thelwall and antinomian
radicals like Spence and Wedderburn, and I did not find that the liberal radicals consistently promoted empire, Orientalism, and the sovereign self. If we
accept Makdisi’s version of political history, then Marx himself, who had very
harsh things to say about utopian socialism, lumpen proletarian rebellion, and
anarchistic anti-authoritarianism, would have to be a “liberal radical,” tied to
modernization and bourgeois democracy. So what, you might ask? Perhaps it
is a good thing—opposition being true friendship—that one can leave Makdisi’s study not only with new insights into Blake’s poetry but with disagreements with the critic’s political interpretations.
Galperin’s Historical Austen is also interested in oppositional reading, but
the overall project is at a very different level of political discourse. Galperin
portrays a more oppositional Austen than that depicted by many of her historicizers, who have largely emphasized the constraints of class and gender to
produce an anti-Jacobin and conservative novelist. He rehistoricizes her by
using de Certeau’s conceptual frame of everyday life and the heterogeneous.
Oppositional practices within the everyday do not aspire to a “position of exteriority,” nor do they inadvertently recuperate established power with strategies of “improvement”; they are means of “getting on,” not “getting out” (30).
The antinomian Blake does, however, have at least one similarity with the
oppositional Austen. Both embrace the “possible” over the “probable”—but
of course Makdisi’s “impossible” is stronger than anything one could find in
Galperin’s Austen.
The study’s argument is shaped diachronically, early versus late Austen,
but the contrast is not mechanically developmental. The book’s organization
is roughly chronological, but the first three chapters are theorized explorations of issues that are treated in the next five, which focus on individual fictions. The book opens with an anecdote about Austen’s aunt, who was arrested
for shoplifting and was probably guilty. Austen never commented on the
episode in any of her letters, and Galperin posits Austen’s silence as an ironic
comment—non-comment—on the oppositional actions of her childless aunt
whose kleptomania—she could easily have paid for the items she stole, and
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she certainly did not have to go to trial—was a symbolic means of rectification
and a gesture of rebellion. Something had been taken away from her—she was
powerless—and she was taking things back. The story is an improbable one
that Austen could have written but Fanny Burney could not have because
Austen understands the power of the normative to harm women. The third
chapter, wittily entitled “Why Jane Austen Is Not Fanny Burney,” explains that
Austen is not truly a realist in the way Burney is because the latter’s narratives
remain within the logic of the normative and the probable, while Austen’s are
within the possible.
Austen’s realism is only apparent: a genuine realist like Maria Edgeworth
could not bear Emma, and Walter Scott was troubled with Miss Bates. Galperin
distinguishes between plot and detail, as plot is the conventional cover story
that can distract readers who want to be distracted from the intricate detail that
undermines the plot’s logic. His reading of Miss Bates is brilliant. A “powerful”
and “progressive” foil to the novel’s other hysteric, Mr. Woodhouse, who is
afraid of everything (190–91), Miss Bates is fully engaged with the world,
enthusiastically sensitive to other people and their needs. The relationship
between her and Knightley is cryptically intimate, provoking Emma’s jealousy
and aggressive hostility. This unmarried daughter of a poor clergyman—who
else would be in that situation?—is also the catalyst for community in Highbury, as she knows everyone (including servants, with whom she converses
extensively) and tries to bring them together. Miss Bates’s much maligned verbal style, the almost free associative blocks of prose we get every time she talks,
disclose, according to Galperin, “possibilities and nuances that would remain
hidden” otherwise (192) because she is so obsessively involved with the real,
with the people in the community, with everyday goings-on. Without repression, she takes her social world into her conversation and makes accessible the
“possible” and the prospect for “change.” Knightley and Mr. Woodhouse,
along with the narrator (usually), are aligned with the forces of probability,
maintaining the established arrangements and extending them unchanged
into the future. Within Miss Bates’s weird prose one glimpses difference, surprises, energy, and the unexpected.
In Emma, then, the plot is working one way—Emma will be proved wrong
and she will come to accept Knightley’s authority—but the details counter this
conservative pedagogy, not just the details of Miss Bates but many others,
which Galperin unfolds with striking originality. Adapting the detail/plot
dialectic from Ross Chambers’s construction of “textual function” and “narrative function,”6 Galperin himself contributes to the discussion of irony with
his concept of epistolarity. The received view is that by abandoning the epistolary style in which her earliest novels were written, by revising Pride and
Prejudice and Sense and Sensibility with narrative omniscience and free indirect discourse, Austen was making huge strides in the development—and
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improvement—of the novel. Galperin argues that narrative omniscience brings
with it a “regulatory” function that works against Austen’s “uncontainable realism.” The single epistolary novel to have survived the transition to the brave new
world of free indirect discourse is Lady Susan, whose subversiveness is readily
apparent. Traces of the epistolary—characters speaking in their own voice without the socially regulative interference of the narrator—are to be found in the
“detail,” the reading of which ironizes the norm-enforcing narrator.
I don’t have space to discuss all the riches in Galperin’s study, an exciting
feature of which is how he brings into play formalist categories and close reading to strengthen an oppositional reading practice that does not depend on
external sources of critical logic. His readings of Austen’s novels are innovative but not idiosyncratic. As with the example of Miss Bates, one thinks after
reading the interpretation: Why didn’t I think of that? How did I miss it? It
seems now obvious. His reading of Austen is more easily melded with the subversive, feminist Austen than with the anti-Jacobin Austen, although Galperin
is careful not to portray Austen as just like Wollstonecraft or Mary Robinson.
The kind of opposition Galperin portrays is within the everyday, not one that
would provoke manifestos.
Opposition is the mode of satire, and the eleven essays on Romantic satire
collected by Steven E. Jones are of a uniformly high quality. When the Romantic lyric seemed to be the only truly Romantic genre, Austen and her satirical
irony seemed to be out of place, but Austen—whose Northanger Abbey is discussed by Karl Kroeber—is obviously at home in a volume about satire. (That
there is not an essay on Blake’s satire is surely just a matter of accident.) If
Romanticism were a reaction against Neoclassicism, and if satire were the
defining Neoclassical genre, Romantic satire had to be anachronistic and oxymoronic, but Romantic satire is now taken for granted as a robust genre manifested in popular prints, poetry, novels, children’s literature, women’s writing,
radical pamphlets, and theatrical pantomimes. First, there turned out to be so
much satire empirically that it could not be dismissed as anomalous, which
Gary Dyer’s bibliography of Romantic satire established beyond dispute.7 Second, the privileging of the lyric was a “strong misreading” of the actual literary situation that repressed other possibilities, one of which was a politically
contentious culture with a strongly satirical component. The French Revolution controversy had thrown up satires of both left and right, and the Waterloo to Peterloo period of political turmoil also produced its explosion of satire.
As long as one ignored the political culture, satire could be viewed as a mere
vestige of a dying Neoclassicism.
The eleven essays collected by Jones illustrate that satire is intergeneric
and not limited to poetry, that it is ideologically complex, and that it unsettles
the clear divisions between high and low, center and periphery. In one of the
most intriguing essays, Tim Fulford shows how the Orientalist trope of Lon-
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don as the new Babylon circulates freely from elite satirical poetry (Cowper,
Wordsworth), to urban commercial spectacles like Dr. Graham’s genteel sex
show (the Elysian Palace—the Temple of Health and Hymen), to satirical
prints mocking politicians like Fox and the Prince Regent, to Byron’s Romantic poetry. The harem enters social discourse from numerous angles. The
harem as an object of desire marketed for clients who submit to the magneticelectrico treatments of Dr. Graham and his scantily clad assistant Vestina at the
Orientalized sex clinic becomes indistinguishable from the legitimate theater
that displays beautiful actresses on sale to the wealthy and powerful, a spectacle which is then satirized as symptomatic of Britain’s moral decline, corrupted by the empire and the infectious East. The East, invested with desire
and fear, can be deployed by satirists for reactionary or progressive purposes.
Byron’s poetry invents personas who play the role of sultan and also huckster
for Orientalist spectacle. The sensationalistic clinic of Dr. Graham appears in
The Prelude and in satirical references to Prince George and Mary “Perdita”
Robinson as well as to the mistress of the naval hero Admiral Nelson; thus the
most innovative literary texts are shaped by sensationalistic culture.
The generic variety of satirical texts discussed in the book is broad. Donelle
Ruwe deals with satire in children’s illustrated chapbooks, a resource few of us
make use of. One of the poets retrieved from obscurity by the project to reexamine the work of neglected women writers, Jane Taylor, was, according to
Stuart Curran, the only woman Romantic poet who specialized in satire; her
style is like Jane Austen’s but from a middle-class Dissenting perspective and
milieu. Marilyn Gaull describes the pantomimes as visual spectacles that
reached thousands of Londoners every night. The Hone-Cruikshank satires,
which were spectacularly popular in the Regency, democratized the public discourse, according to the argument of Kyle Grimes. Even the essays that deal
with traditional literary texts take unusual interpretive angles. Karl Kroeber
applies sociobiology to Austen’s Northanger Abbey; Michael Gamer shows that
Gifford’s motives in attacking the Della Cruscan school were not entirely aesthetic but also commercial, in that the publisher of the Della Cruscans, John
Bell, was a hated source of cheap reprints that disrupted a London monopoly.
Several essays clarify the ideological conflicts within which individual satires
participated. Popular and elite culture are mixed in Marcus Wood’s essay on
racist satire, as the symbols and tropes in the pro-slavery satire Voyage of the
Sable Venus, by Bryan Edwards (1793), reappear in one of Wordsworth’s 1820
poems. Nicola Trott demonstrates how the parodies of the “simple”
Wordsworth were actually part of a cultural system that produced both a “new
school” of poetry and a “new school” of criticism that attacked it: Wordsworth’s
own texts contained parodies of themselves just waiting to be activated. There
is, then, no simple contrast between the reactionaries and the progressives in
the battle over Wordsworth. Gary Dyer’s treatment of Thomas Moore’s topical
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satires reveals the immediate political issues that are represented ambiguously
enough to signify both seditiously and innocently, if the text needs defending
in court. Romantic satire, a rich area of study in part because conflict and social
desire are so prominent, reveals more effectively than lyrical poems how
Romantic-era culture functioned.
The prophetic is a literary mode long associated with Romanticism. The
new study of Romantic prophecy by Ian Balfour provides what will become the
standard work on the topic, but it still leaves areas for further development and
inquiry. Enlightenment figures like Bishop Robert Lowth, Richard Hurd,
William Warburton, Johann Herder, and Johann Eichorn established biblical
poetry as literature and provided ways of reading the Bible as a historically specific Oriental text. They prepared the way for the Romantics to take up poetry
as prophecy, the poet as prophet. Balfour brings prophecy back into our own
critical moment with Walter Benjamin and his messianic approach to history.
The post-Enlightenment Bible could be read poetically and mythologically, not just religiously. (Spinoza, too radical for scholars in the eighteenth
century to claim, is of course the key precursor who historicized the Bible;
Mendelssohn had to fight against being linked with him.) Balfour tells the
story of the Enlightenment’s disenchantment of the Bible in chapters 3, 4, and
5. It might be churlish to utter anything but praise for a task so well performed,
but there is a gap in his narrative. Lowth aimed to “read the Hebrew scriptures
as the Hebrews did” (77), but the Enlightenment scholars were utterly indifferent, if not contemptuous, about how actual Jews read their own scriptures.
Balfour takes note of the Enlightenment anti-Judaism and even anti-Semitism,
but David Ruderman has described how Jews publicly contested the Christian
interpretations.8 For example, Lowth championed an idiosyncratic revision
of the Masoretic Hebrew text undertaken by Benjamin Kennicott, who wanted
a truer version of scripture undistorted by Judaism; David Levi criticized both
Lowth and Kennicott. Similarly, the discussion of Herder and Eichorn requires
the insertion of a Jewish presence, not just the anti-Semitism but the development of the Haskalah, the specifically Jewish Enlightenment.
The study’s final three chapters focus on the prophetic in Blake’s Milton,
Hölderlin’s “Germanien,” and Coleridge’s The Statesman’s Manual. These three
chapters on Romantic prophetic texts are careful, elegant, nuanced readings
with a density of analysis that is impossible to summarize; chapter 7, on “Germanien,” includes a brilliant excursus on religion and Idealism. The chapter
on The Statesman’s Manual proves what a strange and offensive if also fascinating writer Coleridge is. Coleridge interprets a part of Isaiah as prophesying
current political events to provoke this apt comment by Balfour: “his reading
is highly implausible, if not absurd” (262). Balfour also unpacks the conflicted
project of the “lay sermons,” addresses to the upper, middle, and working
classes. Coleridge wants the upper and middle classes to “read the Bible so as
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to control and guide the lower classes” (264), and his promised sermon to the
working class is never composed because he has nothing to say to them
except, perhaps, submit (268). In the 1790s this same writer, the pantisocrat,
had referred to property as the origin of all evil. Balfour deconstructs
Coleridge’s affirmation of the symbol and symbolic politics by pointing to the
allegorical style of his political rhetoric. He can speak to the upper and middle
classes, not the poor; there is no universal language, no universal audience, no
effective prophetic announcement. He tries but fails to situate his political discourse in relation to divine authority as prophecy.
Like Makdisi, Balfour draws upon Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of
History” as a model for interpretation, especially a way to repudiate a particular
kind of Whiggish or antiquarian historicism which assumes an empty interpretive temporality; Benjamin’s historian resides famously within the Jeztzeit, the
“now time.” Balfour refers to the messianic dimension of interpretation, but in
his book that dimension remains largely formal, a categorical affirmation rather
than an explicitly politicized one, and that seems to me the correct move. Balfour’s is critical scholarship that tarries with the negative, so to speak; it is not
the politicized criticism that has discovered a revolutionary agency.
The final two works under consideration are theory books, even though
they also have readings of literary texts. Politics, a major theme here as it is
with all the books under review, is so important that it almost overwhelms the
aesthetic. A theme in both Redfield and Hamilton is the relation between
the aesthetic and the political, but their projects—the one deconstructive, the
other Habermasian—are not really similar. Redfield deploys with elegance
and wit de Manian deconstruction to provide rhetorical readings of nationalism as it appears in several texts, principally Fichte’s Addresses to the German
Nation (1808) and Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1991), a particularly inspired pairing (ch. 1). Using Matthew Arnold’s “The Function of
Criticism at the Present Time” (1865) as a text still forceful in our own time
(William Bennett and other cultural conservatives reproduce its arguments),
Redfield explores the figurative logic of the body in aesthetics and the construction of national taste (ch. 2). The third chapter is a fiercely argued defense
of de Man as providing the most effective critique of ideology—such as the
kind of ideology found in Schiller’s idea of aesthetic education. The last two
chapters are fresh readings of Schlegel’s Lucinde and Shelley’s Mask of Anarchy
that work out the implications of gender and sexuality (ch. 4) and political
oratory (ch. 5) as they bear on Redfield’s overall discussion of nationalism,
aesthetics, and Romanticism.
The defense of de Man is a little shrill—the criticism of him both before and
after his death was not all in bad faith—but Redfield can hardly exaggerate the
marginalization of de Man that followed the war writings controversy. De Man
seems to be returning to a position of some importance in Romantic studies,
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which is certainly appropriate, and it is important that deconstructive work
continue to develop. Redfield’s rhetorical readings that unpack the figurative
language of key texts upholding nationalism, aesthetic taste, and revolutionary opposition are powerful. The comparatist style of analysis is especially
valuable for the innovative contrasts, and also in terms of countering the
English-only linguistic imperialism of our new world order. By introducing
the Freudian problematic of mourning by way of Fichte into Anderson’s discussion of nationalism, Redfield adds new dimensions to the conversation on
imagined community. The reading of voice in The Mask of Anarchy is fascinating for its dramatization of the primal scene of nationalism—an orator
addressing the entire nation—and for the poem’s own equivocations concerning the orator, described circumspectly as a voice “as if” coming from the
maternal earth. What could be more substantial, natural, than mother earth?
Shelley gestures to a foundation he takes away with two words, “as if,” and the
reader is also never sure of how the dream vision that inaugurates the poem
ever comes to a close (a central point made by Susan Wolfson in an influential
reading that Redfield draws upon).9 This does not seem to be a voice but
words, words that have to be repeated again and again to have political force.
Redfield’s rhetorical reading yields dividends throughout the study, including
the shrewd account of The Cenci in relation to the Shelleyan figure of the
inspired poet: both the patriarchal villain Count Cenci and the unacknowledged legislator are represented as machine-like, affectless vehicles through
whom impersonal Power operates, torturing other bodies in the one case,
expressing words that come from Elsewhere in the other.
I cannot leave the book without noting a tendency that is evident, for
example, in the comments on the work of Paul Younquist and Elaine Scarry,
whose use of the body as a prelinguistic ground Redfield characterizes as a
“fantasy,” a word he uses twice just in case we missed it the first time (215
n. 11). It is reprehensible to call serious work by other scholars fantasies.
Is de Manian deconstruction the proverbial last word, the “endgame” of
ideology critique? Paul Hamilton does not think so. “An escape from, rather
than a negotiation of, ideological difference is linguistically impractical. Such
emancipation would so defamiliarize language as indeed to leave it as the
unusable, meaningless, strange, noumenal material, always to be approached
as if for the first time, that is the aesthetic object imagined in Paul de Man’s
hyperbolic, Kantian suspension of identity. De Man’s ideologically disabused
view of language actually looks . . . prelinguistic” (217). Prelinguisticality
seems to be in the eye of the beholder. Hamilton, who in fact makes considerable use of de Man throughout his work, has given us a very ambitious rethinking of Romanticism, even though eight of the thirteen chapters appeared in an
earlier form as essays in other publications where he rethought Romantic theory for more than a decade. The first three and last four chapters are theoreti-
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cally focused on developing his concept of metaromanticism, while the middle six chapters are readings of Romantic literary texts. However fine the readings, I will concentrate on the theoretical dimension.
So what is metaromanticism? With Schlegel and Rousseau as his key
authors, with the Mischgedicht (“generically conflicted” work [11]) as the
favored genre, Hamilton develops a metaromanticism that “trumps critique”
by a perspectivism within Romanticism, not outside of it. The metaromantic
moment is when a Romantic text performs its own critique, and metaromantic writing, notably in Rousseau and Schlegel, poeticizes philosophy and theorizes poetry (9), while the overall metaromantic project is to stage a mutual
interrogation of philosophy and literature (5). Habermas is the tutelary spirit
inspiring the emphasis on dialogue and negotiation, interpreting different disciplines to each other, and hybrid discourses. One of Hamilton’s decisive borrowings is the idea of the “stand-in” (Platzhalter) that Habermas develops in
“Philosophy as Stand-In and Interpreter” (1983; English translation 1990).10
Forsaking the philosophy of consciousness and philosophical foundationalism of all kinds, Habermas steers a course between those who liquidate philosophy entirely and the “master thinkers” who provoke our anxiety.
Philosophy’s new role is as mediating interpreter on behalf of the lifeworld
(Lebenswelt), and such mediation between modernity (science, law and
ethics, the arts and art criticism) and the lifeworld is the only way philosophy
can retain a legitimate hold on totality. Hamilton explicitly rejects other
approaches to ideology, including Adornian non-identity—which surrenders
“all cognitive competence to art” (18)—and all forms of external critique that
violate the hermeneutical assumption of Heidegger and Gadamer that critique
and the object of critique share a “common being” (9). Traditional critique
sees Romantic idealization as compensatory displacement, but Hamilton rescues a form of idealization with the model of communication, in which there
is always a dimension of idealization, a discursive “reserve” for future semantic adjustments and sympathetic engagements, as communication aspires to
an ever deferred “full communication” (13). Metaromantic texts and metaromantic moments within texts are especially amenable to the hypothetical and
temporal qualities Hamilton is promoting as an alternative to the dichotomous structure of traditional ideology critique. This Schlegelian revision of
Habermas is unique and promising.
To clarify his project, Hamilton shows us Romantic texts that are not
metaromantic and contrasts them with texts that are. Schiller, in the second
chapter, is his prime example—along with Wordsworth—of the Romantic
who resists enlistment into the metaromantic cause. Schiller’s idealization of
the past (the “naive” poetry and its world) is projected onto a future that will
never arrive because the structure of internalization carefully quarantines the
beautiful that might otherwise critically engage an unjust present world.
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Wordsworth’s symbolic style works similarly, turning all real-life losses into
aesthetic gains. The Wordsworthian text provides no exits to other discursive
realms. In contrast, Hamilton celebrates the Rousseauian text, especially the
reverie that enacts a letting-go and surrender to the environment, as
Rousseau’s autobiographical impulses give rise to more and more texts that are
generically innovative and that lack aesthetically recuperative symbolism.
Rousseau exposes “aesthetics to the depredations of other discourses” (66).
Other chapters also compare and contrast, for example, the metaromantic
writing of Tom Paine and the aesthetically armored Libor Amoris by Hazlitt
(ch. 10); Barbauld and Dorothy Wordsworth are also brought into a reading
that highlights their antisymbolic metaromanticism (chs. 10 and 11).
If metaromanticism is simply a way to separate the metaromantic sheep
from the Romantic goats, it will not be nearly as interesting as the theory seems
to be. Hamilton’s reading of Schiller and Wordsworth is not inadequate as far
as it goes, but one hopes that the dialectic would continue beyond the point
where the two great writers are simply negative examples. Indeed, Hamilton
cites favorably the fine humanistic reading of Wordsworth by David
Bromwich, Disowned by Memory (1998), and if we are to take seriously the dialogic spirit the book recurrently invokes, then I suggest that somehow we find
a way to bring together antithetical readings—if we are really committed to
immanent critique, remaining within and not outside Romanticism.
The politics of Romanticism now has a variety of meanings. If Makdisi’s
dichotomy of antinomian resistance and liberal institutionalization were just
a heuristic to probe Blake and other 1790s writers, then its politicizing of the
aesthetic would not be as absolute as it is. Makdisi’s approach is not the only
way to rescue the antinomian left from neglect and condescension, not the
only way to pay homage to the spirit of Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy
of History.” Makdisi’s valuable treatment of modernization, however, points to
a fresh area for further work. Not unlike the politics of the antinomian left, the
politics of the everyday that Galperin brings to bear on his reading of Austen
points to a politics that operates below the representation system of the “political nation,” the official politics. The play between detail and plot that reveals
the micropolitics of power and resistance is a promising way to read texts in
addition to Austen’s. Perhaps satire can no longer count as a neglected archive,
as it, along with Romantic drama and women’s writing, continues to receive
the attention it deserves, thereby displacing the older interpretative politics of
exclusion. Future studies of the prophetic will bring together Balfour’s focus
and texts and Makdisi’s—and other relevant prophetic writing—because few
subgenres are as central to Romanticism as prophecy. The comparatist
method, which has proven to be so useful in three of the studies under review,
should perhaps be applied also to the textuality of actual religions in researching the prophetic—Methodist autobiographies, Hasidic tales, spiritualism, the
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Great Awakening, organized freethinking, millenarian movements, German
Pietism, the Haskalah, the Oxford movement, antimodernist Catholicism, as
well as the antinomian enthusiasm. Religion is a resource Romanticists have
shied away from, but within a cultural studies framework there is no good reason to continue doing so. Finally, whither theory? Or Theory? It is not clear
exactly where it will lead and how productive it will be, but the Habermasian
turn described by Hamilton signals an exciting new development.
Wayne State University
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